Data on New Zealand manufacturing plants are used to examine the impact of trade liberalisation on plant exit. Recent theories suggest that the prospect of a declining market might lead firms to strategic behaviour that causes low cost plants to exit first. This hypothesis is generally unsupported. Surviving plants were larger, lower cost, and were owned by specialised firms with few plants. Plant costs were more important than firm size for explaining the plant-closing behaviour of single-plant firms. Diversified, multi-plant firms were more likely to close plants and were influenced by plant size but not plant costs.
(Hamilton and Kniest, 1991); 27 percent of the plants in our sample earned at least 5 percent of revenue from exports. The price transmission elasticity between imports and local manufacturing prices was significantly less than one (0.7), suggesting imperfect substitution (Chiao and Scobie, 1990).
Another important reason for looking towards the declining market literature was the phased nature of the trade liberalisation. Tendering of Australia-only import licenses began in 1981 and then extended to global licenses in 1984. Potential market share for imports was allowed to grow by 5 percentage points per year, until quota premium fell below 7.5%. Thus local firms faced a predictable declining market for several years, until licensing ended in 1988. A staged reduction in tariffs began in 1986.
As a result of this protection reform, the effective rate of assistance to manufacturing fell from 39 percent in 1981/82 to 19 percent in 1988/89. Import penetration increased from around 26 percent in 1982 to 31 percent in 1989. Employment declined (see Table 1 ), many plants were closed and others were rationalised.
By December 1990 there was only 78% of the employment that had existed five years earlier. 2 In our data sample job losses were shared in approximately a 1:2 ratio between plant closings and employment contraction. In February 1986 there were approximately 4000 plants in our dataset, by November 1989 almost one-fifth had closed down.
3 Table 1 
III. Prior Theoretical and Empirical Findings on Exit From Declining Industries
Recent theoretical models suggest that the order of exit determined by market forces is not necessarily welfare optimal (Whinston, 1988; Dierickx, Matutes and Neven, 1991) . In these models, plant and firm size, and relative costs influence exit from declining industries. Firm characteristics should not matter in 4 exit from a competitive industry: plants earning the lowest quasi-rents drop out until the remaining, most efficient, plants are able to earn a normal return.
The best known model of exit is the capacity driven model of Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) . Cournot behaviour in a duopoly facing falling demand causes the largest firm to leave first, if industry costs (equal for both firms) are common knowledge and production is all-or-nothing. It leaves because both firms recognise that the smaller producer will be a profitable monopolist over a longer period of falling demand.
Extending to oligopoly, the last firm to exit is again the one with the longest profitable tenure as a monopolist, implying that exit occurs in decreasing order of firm size.
Although large firms appear to be at a strategic disadvantage they are often lower cost producers, either because of the advantages of scale or some inherent efficiencies which enabled them to grow large. Under
Cournot assumptions a lower cost firm should have a larger share of the industry, so large firms might exit first for strategic reasons or last for cost reasons. Therefore, an interesting question is, how big a cost advantage does the large firm need to reverse the order of exit? In the Ghemawat and Nalebuff (hereafter G&N) model, with a demand elasticity of -1.5 and a market share of 70 percent, the larger firm will still drop out first unless its smaller rival has more than a 53 percent cost disadvantage. 4 A subsequent model allowing continuous capacity adjustment predicts that the largest firm reduces capacity until it shrinks to the size of its smaller rival, and the two then shrink together (G&N, 1990 ). This convergence of market share occurs because the bigger firm has more incentive to reduce capacity given its larger share of any resulting benefits of higher price.
Although interesting, models based on single-plant firms are restrictive. 5 What happens when multi-plant 5 firms are introduced? When plant sizes are unequal and capacity adjusts in plant-sized lumps, there is no simple, size-based rule for predicting exit (Whinston, 1988 Empirical studies provide mixed support for the theoretical predictions. A common finding is that larger plants are less likely to exit. Examples include the U.S. steel (Deily, 1988 (Deily, , 1991 , and chemical industries (Lieberman, 1990) , and a broad cross-section of U.S. industries (Dunne, et al. 1989) . But in the U.K. steel 7 castings industry plant size had no effect in a logit model of closure (Baden-Fuller, 1989 ). These results may show that cost advantages outweigh the strategic disadvantages of size although it is difficult to measure plant cost levels. A related finding is that plants using low cost technology are less likely to exit Deily (1991).
Size of the owning firm had no impact on plant closure in Baden-Fuller's results. Deily (1991) found that (at the mean) increasing firm size reduced the probability of exit. Lieberman found that increasing firm size 
IV. Model Specification
A firm facing declining demand is modelled as choosing to either let a plant carry on producing or close the plant down. Firm i faces opportunity cost hijm when continuing to operate plant j in industry m. The opportunity cost is the sum of three factors:
where Cijm is the production cost, r is the firm's discount rate, Sijm is the current resale value of plant and other assets, and Eikm is the 'external' benefit to the other k plants owned by the firm after the closing of 8 plant j. It would be profitable for the firm to cease operating the plant when,
where TRijm is the revenue earned by the plant and E is the expected value. Any factor increasing Cijm, r, Sijm, or Eikm will increase the probability of closure.
The testable implications of the theory models fit into the framework of (1) and (2). Cijm captures the prediction that high cost plants should exit. Younger plants should have low Cijm according to Deily (1991).
Conversely, younger plants should have high Sijm and thus be more likely to exit (Baden-Fuller). The G&N (1990) prediction of large firms choosing to make incremental capacity reductions is captured by Eikm, which is also linked with the prediction of multi-plant firms being more likely to close plants (Whinston).
The earlier occurrence in time of E(TRijm) < E(hijm) for the larger of two single-plant firms in a duopoly captures the G&N (1985) prediction.
Regarding the lower likelihood of exit for plants owned by specialised firms, Sijm is often negative in a declining industry, due especially to labour termination costs. The option of moving workers to other branches increases Sijm for diversified firms. With negative Sijm, a higher discount rate makes closure less likely because borrowing, to pay termination costs, is more expensive. Large firms have the advantage of lower discount rates (Baden-Fuller). The specialist firm's agency problem can be thought of as reduced willingness to undertake the calculations embodied in (2).
The empirical model was estimated using a logit specification. The dependent variable equals one if a plant that was open in April 1986 had closed by November 1989. The probability of plant closure is related to the following set of plant, firm and industry characteristics (see Table 2 ).
Plant Characteristics
The unit cost of production in a plant depends on the technology used, the throughput over which to spread fixed costs, the cost of purchased inputs, and the efficiencies with which productive factors are combined.
We use the ratio of expenses on materials and labour to sales revenue, EXPSALES, as a proxy for plant production costs. This variable includes output-invariant period costs of keeping facilities ready for production (e.g., maintenance labour during a mothballed phase If the capital employed is very specific to the plant it will have a low resale value because it cannot be readily adapted to other applications. A low value of Sijm reduces the probability of exit, particularly when exit is measured by its actual occurrence rather than the onset of reduced investment activity (Deily, 1988).
The variable used to measure the specificity of capital is based on energy utilisation, using the relationship:
where Fj is total fuel consumption in thermal units, Kj is the stock of capital and Uj is the utilisation rate (Bosworth, 1979). The variable, CAPSALES, the ratio of fuel consumption to sales revenue, should increase with the specificity of capital. 9 Plants with high values of CAPSALES should be less likely to make observed exits.
Finally, the proportion of the plant's material inputs that are imported, PIMPORT, may affect exit.
Liberalisation brought no advantage of cheaper imported inputs because they were already free of licensing and duty. Reduction in protection on outputs might shift cost advantages to overseas plants. Plants with high values of PIMPORT may have been those established to carry out final assembly behind protective walls, so can be expected to close once those walls fell. 10 
Firm Characteristics
Single-plant firms are in no position to reap 'external' benefits from closure of their plant (Eikm=0) so are less likely to close. We measure this effect with MULTI, the number of plants operated by the firm. More plants implies a larger sized firm so a positive coefficient also supports the prediction of large firms making incremental capacity reductions (G&N, 1990).
A dummy variable, DIVERS, is used to test for the effect of firm diversification on plant closing decisions.
DIVERS takes a value of one if the firm has plants in other industries. The coefficient should be positive, reflecting the greater ease with which multi-product firms can close plants due to higher Sijm (less negative) and lower r, as well as fewer agency problems.
When multinational enterprises (MNEs) close branch plants and replace their market share with imports the external benefit is captured entirely by the parent. This sort of behaviour is likely to be common in New
Zealand because MNEs set up affiliate plants to overcome protective barriers (Deane, 1970) . Therefore the MNE can probably meet domestic demand from lower cost sources once import barriers are dismantled.
The variable FOREIGN takes a value of one if a foreign controlled firm owns the plant. We expect a positive coefficient on FOREIGN.
Industry Characteristics
Exit should vary with the intensity of industry adjustment pressure from trade liberalisation. The variable ERACUT, the change in the effective rate of assistance to the industry, measures this. The type of protection may also be relevant. Firms with plants in quota-protected industries were often given import licenses to complement their product range. Once licensing was abolished any quota rent was lost, as was the considerable protection given, so failure rates are expected to be higher in these industries. We measure this effect with QUOTA, the share of industry effective rate of assistance provided by import licensing.
V. Data and Results
Data was obtained on all accounting units (i.e., firms or business divisions) employing at least 25 workers The logit estimator in TSP (version 3.1b) was used to estimate coefficients, heteroskedastically robust standard errors and changes in the probability of closure with respect to changes in the explanatory variables (Xi). This 'quasi-elasticity' is calculated as:
wherep is the predicted probability of plant closure. The derivative of the logit probability is calculated at the mean closure probability. Table 3 reports the logit estimation results and probability derivatives. Only CAPSALES is not statistically significant (the t-statistic is just outside the 5 percent level). The model as a whole is highly significant and correctly predicts 82 percent of the choices that firms made for their plants. Table 3 Plants with high production costs, as measured by EXPSALES, were more likely to exit. In the full sample the probability derivative is small: a doubling (at the mean) of the expenses to sales ratio would only increase the probability of exit by 0.6 percent. However the probability derivative appears to be depressed 13 by plants, in the upper tail of EXPSALES, which have expenses to sales ratios greater than two. Removing these 63 observations leaves other coefficient values unchanged but increases the coefficient on EXPSALES to 0.647 (t=2.23). The probability derivative at the mean rises to 9.3 percent, which is the most elastic response of any variable. Thus the result for EXPSALES in Table 3 appears both robust and understated.
The SHARE coefficient is negative and highly significant, indicating that larger plants were less likely to close. Increasing SHARE from two percentage points (the mean) to three would reduce closure probability by one percentage point. A similarly proportionate increase in SHARE but at one standard deviation above the mean (from 6 percent to 9 percent) would reduce closure probability to 14 percent.
The coefficient on YOUTH suggests that younger plants were more likely to exit. Splitting the sample in two, based on CAPSALES, showed a stronger relationship between YOUTH and plant closure in the plants using less specialised capital. 11 In the low CAPSALES sub-sample, the probability derivative was 2.9 percent, in the high CAPSALES sub-sample it was 1.6 percent. If the higher salvage value of new capital goods does outweigh lower running costs, resulting from superior embodied technology, the effect is less apparent when the outside uses of the capital goods are limited.
The coefficient on CAPSALES is negative as expected but the probability derivative is small. The high variation in energy intensity across plants gives CAPSALES a large standard deviation (s.d), so the probability derivative is much larger (-2.97 percent) one s.d. above the mean. The PIMPORT coefficient has the expected positive sign.
Of the variables measuring firm characteristics, MULTI and DIVERS were signed as expected and 14 statistically significant, and FOREIGN had an unexpected sign. The predicted probability of closure for a plant owned by a diversified company was 3.3 percentage points above that of other plants. The common perception of closing costs being lower for diversified firms is supported by this result.
The predicted probability of closure for a plant owned by a foreign controlled company (FOREIGN=1) which the firm configures it's capacity has a major effect on the overall plant closure probability.
The industry characteristics have the expected effects: plants were more likely to close where the cuts in protection were greatest and where the protection had been based on import licensing. The small probability derivative for ERACUT suggests that deeper cuts in protection may not have increased plant closure very much. This must be tempered by the wide variation in intensity of trade liberalisation: for industries where ERACUT was one s.d. above the mean, the probability derivative increases to over three percent.
In general, the results in Table 3 suggest that the plants likely to survive trade liberalisation were larger, lower cost, older, used specialised capital and were owned by specialised firms with few plants. Socially undesirable outcomes, due to strategic behaviour by firms, are not very evident. However the important result that larger plants were less likely to exit may disguise some strategic behaviour. What has been found is the net effect of two conflicting influences, lower cost versus strategic liability, measured from a sample of both single and multi-plant firms.
To disentangle these influences, Figure 1 The logit model was re-estimated with a set of plant size dummy variables interacting with SHARE, to see if the U-shaped pattern holds when controlling for other influences on closure. Results of the share-dummy models are in Table 4 . Plants with sales shares below two percent form the base group. The dummy variable Di equals one for plant share i% and zero for other values of SHARE (except D5, which equals one for all plants with SHARE$5 percent). Table 4 16
The hypothesis of a non-linear relationship between SHARE and exit cannot be rejected in either the full In the single-plant sub-sample plant size has no relationship, either linearly or non-linearly, with plant exit.
The prediction of G&N (1985) is not supported. Firm size, as measured by plant numbers, does influence multi-plant exit, which supports G&N (1990). These findings are similar to Lieberman (1990) .
The other important result in Table 4 Single-plant firms gain no external benefits from plant exit so production cost clearly counts more heavily in their closing decision. Other aspects of decision making by the single-plant firm are less clear; capital specificity has no influence but plant age is more important than it is for multi-plant firms. Decision making by the multi-plant firm involves more tradeoffs amongst plant production costs, salvage values and external benefits. The insignificance of EXPSALES suggests that the firm may close a low cost plant first if the larger external benefits or higher salvage values outweigh the cost disadvantage of the surviving plants.
VI. Implications
The evidence presented here shows that larger, lower cost, and older plants survived the New Zealand trade liberalisation. This is somewhat consistent with the Eastman and Stykolt hypothesis that a protected oligopoly reacts to trade liberalisation by closing high cost capacity, reducing product variety and exploiting scale economies internal to the plant. These results tend to favour the optimists, such as Harris (1984), who predict large welfare gains from free trade.
In particular, a variety of tests showed that the probability of plant exit decreased with increasing plant size. The rate of decrease in probability was greatest for mid-sized plants (3 percent share of industry sales). The non-linear relationship was also able to be summarised by a quadratic, whose derivative, 
